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Abstract
Active inference introduces a theory describing action-
perception loops via the minimisation of variational (and
expected) free energy or, under simplifying assumptions,
(weighted) prediction error. Recently, active inference has
been proposed as part of a new and unifying framework in
the cognitive sciences: predictive processing. Predictive pro-
cessing is often associated with traditional computational the-
ories of the mind, strongly relying on internal representations
presented in the form of generative models thought to ex-
plain different functions of living and cognitive systems. In
this work, we introduce an active inference formulation of
the Watt centrifugal governor, a system often portrayed as the
canonical “anti-representational” metaphor for cognition. We
identify a generative model of a steam engine for the gover-
nor, and derive a set of equations describing “perception” and
“action” processes as a form of prediction error minimisation.
In doing so, we firstly challenge the idea of generative mod-
els as explicit internal representations for cognitive systems,
suggesting that such models serve only as implicit descrip-
tions for an observer. Secondly, we consider current propos-
als of predictive processing as a theory of cognition, focusing
on some of its potential shortcomings and in particular on the
idea that virtually any system admits a description in terms
of prediction error minimisation, suggesting that this theory
may offer limited explanatory power for cognitive systems.
Finally, as a silver lining we emphasise the instrumental role
this framework can nonetheless play as a mathematical tool
for modelling cognitive architectures interpreted in terms of
Bayesian (active) inference.
Introduction
The free energy principle (FEP) has been proposed as a
framework to study perception, action and higher order cog-
nitive functions using probabilistic generative models (Fris-
ton et al., 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015; Buckley et al.,
2017). Under the FEP and related approaches, including
the Bayesian brain hypothesis, perception is usually char-
acterised as a process of (approximate Bayesian) inference
on the hidden states and causes that generate sensory input.
Predictive coding models describe how this process may be
implemented in a biologically plausible fashion by minimis-
ing a mismatch error between incoming sensations and pre-
dictions, or rather estimates, of these sensations produced
by a probabilistic generative model (Rao and Ballard, 1999;
Spratling, 2016). Active inference extends this account of
perceptual processes by 1) noting that they can be treated
as a special case of a more general framework based on the
minimisation of variational free energy under Gaussian as-
sumptions and by 2) proposing a description of action and
behaviour consistent with the minimisation of prediction er-
ror and variational (and expected) free energy (Friston et al.,
2010, 2017). Active inference thus proposes that agents
minimise prediction errors by both generating better esti-
mates of current and future sensory input and, at the same
time, acting in the environment to directly update this input
to better fit current predictions. These actions are biased to-
wards normative constraints (in the form of prior Bayesian
beliefs) that ensure their very existence, closing the sensori-
motor loop and sidestepping “dark room” paradoxes (Friston
et al., 2010, 2012; Buckley et al., 2017; Friston et al., 2017;
Baltieri and Buckley, 2019a).
In (philosophy of) cognitive science, active inference is
usually identified within the framework of predictive pro-
cessing (Clark, 2013). Predictive processing and active
inference are often thought to align with more represen-
tationalist views of cognition (Froese and Ikegami, 2013;
Gładziejewski, 2018). One part of the cognitive science
community sees this as a possible advantage (Hohwy, 2013;
Wiese and Metzinger, 2017; Gładziejewski, 2018) while
others see it as one of its main drawbacks (Froese and
Ikegami, 2013; Anderson, 2017; Zahavi, 2017). Others have
argued it may be consistent with embodied and enactive per-
spectives of cognition, claiming that the strengths of the FEP
reside in generative models with no explicit representational
role (Bruineberg et al., 2018; Kirchhoff and Froese, 2017).
A different perspective highlights the potential of the FEP
for the formalisation of “action-oriented” views of cogni-
tion (Engel et al., 2016; Clark, 2015), attempting to recon-
cile computational views and embodied/enactive positions.
As a thinking tool on the role of predictive processing as
a theory of cognition, we introduce an active inference re-
interpretation of a now classical example in the literature
of “anti-representational” accounts of cognitive systems, the
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Watt governor. The Watt (flyball or centrifugal) steam gov-
ernor was used by Van Gelder (1995, 1998) as a paradig-
matic system to challenge the dominant cognitivist under-
standing of cognition. Van Gelder (1995, 1998) claimed
that dynamical systems theory provided a better language to
explain the inner workings of cognitive agents, similarly to
what engineers have done with the Watt governor in terms
of attractors, stability analysis, etc.. At the same time, he
then questioned whether computational descriptions of the
governor offered any explanatory power – over – the use of
dynamical systems theory. While many proponents of the
dynamicist view see the computational metaphor as super-
fluous in many cases (Chemero, 2009), or intimately tied to
a deeply flawed philosophy of mind (Dreyfus, 1972), others
see computational and information-theoretic descriptions of
a system as useful epistemic tools offering interpretations
that are complementary to a dynamical systems analysis
(Bechtel, 1998; Beer and Williams, 2015). In both cases, the
nature of the tight coupling between a flyball governor and
its steam engine is accepted, and the resulting mode of cog-
nition departs from the cognitivist one, i.e., a governor does
not “read” the speed of the engine to “compute”, offline, the
next best action. In this light, a more appropriate explana-
tion of such coupled systems mandates circular, rather than
linear causality, in line with embodied/enactive approaches
to cognitive science highlighting the importance of studying
the dynamical interaction of an agent and its environment.
The Watt governor
The centrifugal (or flyball) governor was introduced as a
mechanism to harvest steam power for industrial applica-
tions, controlling the speed of steam engines using proper-
ties of negative feedback loops (A˚stro¨m and Murray, 2010).
The centrifugal governor regulates the amount of steam ad-
mitted into a cylinder via a mechanism that opens and closes
a valve controlling the amount of steam released by an en-
gine. This regulation requires balancing the forces applied to
a pair of flyballs secured via two arms to a rotating spindle,
geared to a flywheel driven by a steam engine (Fig. 1).
At rest, the flyballs are subject to gravitational force and
the two arms are in a vertical position while the engine’s
valve is fully open. As the engine is powered and steam
flows into the cylinders via the fully open valve, the engine’s
flywheel velocity is increased, alongside the vertical spin-
dle’s angular velocity. The attached flyballs’ kinetic energy
thus also increases, counteracting the effects of the gravita-
tional force, slowly bringing the arms away from a vertical
position. Once the spindle’s velocity reaches a certain bound
set by the physical properties of the system (and thus indi-
rectly by the engineer who built it), the steam valve of the
engine is slowly closed via a beam linkage connected to a
thrust bearing attached to the flyballs’ arms. When the steam
flow decreases, the vertical spindle slows down, reopening
the valve that will move the flyballs to increase once more
the speed of the shaft, closing the valve, etc. until a stable
equilibrium is reached for a certain steam flow associated to
a specific angle between the flyballs’ arms and the vertical
shaft.
Using a standard formulation by Pontryagin (1962), based
on previous work by Vyshnegradsky (1877) and Maxwell
(1868), we define a Watt governor as a conical pendulum
with two flyballs (the “bobs”) travelling at constant angular
speed φ
ψ¨ = (φ)2 sin(ψ) cos(ψ)− g
l
sin(ψ)− b
m
ψ˙ (1)
based on a simple derivation of Newtonian’s laws from
Fig. 1, and with all variables explained in more detail in ta-
ble 1. A steam engine is then attached via a flywheel with
Figure 1: The Watt Governor. The Watt, or centrifugal,
governor connected to a throttle valve regulating the flow of
steam allowed into the cylinders of a steam engine. (Original
image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.)
Table 1: Watt governor, variables and constants.
Description
ψ, φ Flyball arm angle and velocity (ψ˙ = φ)
ω Steam engine flywheel angular speed
I Steam engine flywheel moment of inertia
G Torque induced by engine load
n Gear or transmission ratio
g Gravitational acceleration
l Length of flyball arms
b Friction constant
m Flyball mass
k Constant relating flyball height and engine torque
angular speed ω, moment of inertia I and a load torque G
Iω˙ = k cos(ψ)−G (2)
The flywheel is geared to the vertical spindle so that the
angular velocities of the engine’s flywheel and the vertical
spindle are proportional, φ = nω, up to a constant n, the
gear ratio. With these assumptions, we can reduce the sys-
tem to a set of first order coupled differential equations,
ψ˙ = φ
φ˙ = (nω)2 sin(ψ) cos(ψ)− g
l
sin(ψ)− b
m
ψ˙
ω˙ =
k
I
cos(ψ)− G
I
(3)
We then find the equilibrium of this system by equating to
zero the left-hand side of equation (3) and by defining a con-
stant shaft velocity ω0 and fixed arm angle ψ0 where the arm
angular velocity is zero, φ = φ0 = 0,
φ0 = 0
cos(ψ0) =
G
k
n2ω20 =
g
l · cos(ψ0) (4)
The system is henceforth linearised near its equilibrium
to simplify the analysis, see Maxwell (1868); Pontryagin
(1962), defining small disturbances ∆ψ,∆φ,∆ω as
∆ψ := ψ − ψ0,
∆φ := φ− φ0,
∆ω := ω − ω0
After neglecting terms quadratic in disturbances
∆ψ,∆φ,∆ω, we finally obtain
∆ψ˙ = ∆φ
∆φ˙ =
g sin2(ψ0)
l · cos(ψ0)∆ψ −
b
m
∆φ+
2g sin(ψ0)
l · ω0 ∆ω
∆ω˙ = − sin(ψ0)k
I
∆ψ (5)
These equations are typically used for the analysis of this
engine-governor coupled system, and represent a simplified
version of the governor’s behaviour near equilibrium. The
spindle angular velocity is initially assumed to be constant
(by construction) to simplify the treatment from a spherical
to a conical pendulum where the flyball arms’ velocity is
zero (φ = φ0 = 0). Details about the steam engine are
usually not provided, only explaining its effects through a
torque Iω˙ which depends on the arm angle ψ given a certain
geometry of the governor, as here expressed in equation (2).
The governor’s generative model
Using active inference, we can re-derive similar equations,
in particular for the engine’s flywheel angular velocity ∆ω˙
in equation (5), building on a previous formulation of
PID control under this framework (Baltieri and Buckley,
2019c). Our formulation includes a generative model in
state-space form that describes observations/measurements,
hidden states, inputs and parameters of the engine “from the
perspective of a governor”.
This description shouldn’t however be taken too literally,
as we will discuss later. In the spirit of Van Gelder (1995,
1998), we will rather highlight the somewhat bizarre nature
of concepts such as measurements performed by a physical
system. In light of this, we thus stress an as-if interpretation
of generative models (McGregor, 2017a; Robert, 2007). Ac-
cording to this idea, physical systems can be interpreted as
if they were cognitive agents, with generative models spec-
ifying their Bayesian beliefs, governing preferences and dy-
namics that produce equations describing perception-action
loops (see also Discussion). In our formulation, this corre-
sponds to a rather unusual reading of the engine-governor
coupled system: an agent trying to stabilise its observations,
i.e., the perceived angle of the flyball arms, by adapting its
own actions, i.e., the valve opening1 (cf. “behaviour as the
control of perception” (Powers, 1973)).
We thus start by defining the following generative model:
ψ = x+ z
x′ = −α(x− ψ0) + w (6)
where ψ, α, x, x′ and ψ0 are, in state-space models terms,
observations, parameters, hidden states and their deriva-
tives2, and exogenous inputs of the engine from the (as-if )
perspective of the controller. Here the observations ψ repre-
sent measurements performed by our agent, i.e., its incom-
ing sensory input about the arm angle. Variables x, x′ define
states (and their derivatives) of the engine hidden to the gov-
ernor and assumed to generate these measurements (similar
1Usually one looks at this system in terms of stabilising the
velocity of the steam engine via the regulation of the arms angle,
however the opposite perspective adopted here 1) currently better
fits with the model presented in Baltieri and Buckley (2019c) and 2)
is perfectly equivalent to the more traditional way of looking at this
problem, since the angle ψ is a single-valued monotonic function
of the angular velocity ω (Pontryagin, 1962) due to the mechanics
of the vertical shaft and the flyball arms, a “stand-in” in the sense
of Bechtel (1998). Interestingly, this view suggests that we might
just as well consider the engine as an “agent” acting to control its
observations of the “environment”, the governor. One way to treat
this issue in a more principled manner is to look at views of agency
that are defined in terms of “interactional asymmetry” of the cou-
pling between agent and environment (Barandiaran et al., 2009).
An in depth discussion of this idea is however left for future work.
2Here we denote derivatives in the generative model with a dash
rather than a dot. The dynamics described by the generative model
are not integrated directly, and are only used to derive a set of equa-
tions describing the recognition dynamics as a gradient on varia-
tional free energy (Friston, 2008; Buckley et al., 2017) (see equa-
tion (10)). The dot notation is used for the generative process in
equation (5), and for the recognition dynamics equation (10) (sim-
plified, under a few assumptions, in equation (16)), which would
be forward-integrated in a simulation.
to the way one normally hides most details about the func-
tioning of a real steam engine in equation (2)). Inputs ψ0
stand for the presence of external factors affecting the sys-
tem in the form of torque loadsG, see equation (4). The first
equation describes how hidden states x are mapped to obser-
vations ψ using an identity function, with a random variable
z introduced to express measurement noise, or rather un-
certainty, from the perspective of our agent. In the second
equation, the parameter α specifies the convergence rate of
the intrinsic dynamics modelled by hidden states x given
inputs ψ0. The fluctuations w are introduced as an uncer-
tainty term on the dynamics of the engine-governor coupled
system, representing for instance errors due to the use of a
linear approximation of the real dynamics near equilibrium.
Using this generative model, the recognition dynamics of
the system can be obtained by, 1) finding an expression for
the variational free energy, and 2) under the assumption that
the quantity of free energy is minimized over time, deriving
a set of differential equations that minimize the free energy
(i.e., following its negative gradient). Under a couple of as-
sumptions described later, these differential equations (i.e.,
the recognition dynamics) reduce to the equation describing
the dynamics of the linearised engine in equation (5).
An expression for the variational free energy can be de-
rived after defining the distributions of z, w, in the simplest
case assuming they are both Gaussian, z ∼ N(µx, σ2z), w ∼
N(ψ0, σ
2
w) and by considering the following expression for
the (Laplace-encoded) free energy (Friston, 2008)3
F ≈ − lnP (ψ, x)
∣∣∣
x=µx
(7)
where F is evaluated near the most likely estimate of hidden
states x, i.e., for a Gaussian distribution, its mean or median,
µx. After rewriting the generative model in equation (6) in
probabilistic form using the definitions of z, w, one obtains
the following expression
F ≈ 1
2
[
piz
(
ψ − µx
)2
+ piw
(
µ′x + α(µx − ψ0)
)2
− ln (pizpiw)]
(8)
where we introduced precisions piz, piw as the inverse vari-
ances of random variables z, w, i.e., piz = 1/σ2z , piw =
1/σ2w. Actions a are then defined under the very general as-
sumption that they have an effect on observations ψ (Friston
et al., 2010; Baltieri, 2019), i.e.,
ψ = f(a) (9)
By minimising free energy on both the means of hidden
states µx and actions a, we then obtain the recognition dy-
namics (Buckley et al., 2017), i.e., a set of differential equa-
tions describing the dynamics of our agent. The recogni-
tion dynamics implement perception (estimation of states
3For a full derivation of this particular form see for instance
Friston et al. (2008); Buckley et al. (2017); Baltieri (2019).
µx) and action (control via actions a) of an agent described
as a closed sensorimotor loop. The minimisation of free en-
ergy is then achieved via the following gradient descent
˙˜µx = µ˜
′
x − kp
∂F
∂µ˜x
a˙ = −ka ∂F
∂a
= −ka ∂F
∂ψ˜
∂ψ˜
∂a
(10)
with learning rates kp and ka. Notice that these equa-
tions use the same dot notation adopted to describe the
generative process of the governor-engine coupled system
in equation (5) and represent an agent’s dynamics actu-
ally integrated to implement (as-if) inference and control
processes. Here we also introduced the use the tilde pre-
viously adopted by Friston (2008); Buckley et al. (2017);
Baltieri (2019) to represent higher embedding orders, in this
case, µ˜x = [µx, µ′x], ψ˜ = [ψ,ψ
′]. More generally, when
higher embedding orders are introduced as a possible way to
represent non-Markovian processes (Friston, 2008; Baltieri,
2019), this requires an extra term, µ˜′x, to ensure the con-
vergence to a trajectory (rather than a point attractor) in a
moving frame of reference (Friston, 2008). For a Watt gov-
ernor at equilibrium, we will however assume that the flyball
arm angular velocity is zero, thus defining a point attractor
where µ˜′x = 0. In this case, equation (10) thus reduces to
µ˙x = µ
′
x − kp
[
− piz
(
ψ − µx
)
+ piwα
(
µ′x + α(µx − ψ0)
)]
µ˙′x = 0
a˙ = −ka ∂ψ
∂a
piz(ψ − µx) (11)
Under a few standard assumptions, this system can then be
further simplified to show actions consistent with the regu-
lation of the speed of a steam engine.
Assumption 1: The dynamics of the generative
model are overdamped
The recognition dynamics in equation (11) specify a gra-
dient descent on the variational free energy in equation (8)
given the generative model in equation (6). Importantly, this
generative model is parameterized by α, a parameter that de-
scribes the rate of convergence of its internal dynamics. As
previously shown, for instance in Baltieri (2019) (Chapter
7.), different choices of α allow for the implementation of
qualitatively different behaviours: from the regulation of a
process to a certain goal (large α), to a purely passive (e.g.,
no actions) process of inference of the hidden properties of
observed stimuli in the spirit of predictive coding models
of perception (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Baltieri and Buckley,
2019a) (small α). Here we will assume a very large parame-
ter α (i.e., α  0 and α  piz, piw), leading to overdamped
dynamics of the generative model in equation (6) dominated
by the first (drift) term. This translates into recognition dy-
namics now describing updates of the average hidden state
µx dominated by terms quadratic in α (Baltieri and Buck-
ley, 2019c) (cf. equation (11)). The expected hidden state
µx thus quickly converges to its steady state (i.e., average
velocity µ′x = 0), defined by the input (or bias term) ψ0,
µ˙x ≈ −kppiwα2(µx − ψ0) =⇒ µx = ψ0 (12)
which readily ensures that the goal of the system is now to
stabilise the flyball arms angle towards ψ0 (NB: in general
ψ0 need not be a fixed point attractor), which in turn reflects
regulation of the velocity of the engine4 (seen also Note 1).
Moreover, since we have assumed α  piz, piw, µx con-
verges much more quickly than a and thus the minimisation
of free energy in equation (11) can be further simplified to
include only the equation for action
a˙ ≈ −ka ∂ψ
∂a
piz(ψ − ψ0) (13)
Assumption 2: Action updates are proportional to
arm angle updates
To show a direct correspondence between the active infer-
ence derivation and the original equations, here we assume
that the measurement precision piz is inversely proportional
to the moment of inertia of the steam engine flywheel I ,
piz =
1
I
=⇒ σ2z ∝ I (14)
or more precisely that piz = kI , using the constant k relating
flyball height and engine torque defined in table 1 (Pontrya-
gin, 1962). We then consider the case where the learning
rate, a hyperparameter of the minimisation scheme (not of
the generative model) is set to 1, ka = 1, and essentially re-
placed by another hyperparameter playing a similar role, the
precision piz . We also assume a linear relationship between
actions a and observations ψ in equation (9), such that
∂ψ
∂a
= constant (15)
using the fact that ∂ψ/∂a need only be positive to ensure
convergence via a negative feedback loop (Denny, 2002).
For convenience we impose ∂ψ/∂a = sin(ψ0), and finally
obtain
a˙ ≈ − sin(ψ0)k
I
(ψ − ψ0) = − sin(ψ0)k
I
∆ψ
(
≡ ∆ω˙
)
(16)
which is equivalent to the simplified engine in equation (5),
under the assumption that ψ0 reflects changes due to dif-
ferent loads as in the original formulation of the governor-
engine system (Pontryagin, 1962). In active inference terms,
equation (16) describes the behaviour of an agent observing
4Under suitable parameters meeting typical stability criteria
(Pontryagin, 1962).
its arms angle ψ (thus indirectly inferring the speed of the
engine, see Note 2). At the same time, this agent acts to pro-
duce a rotational energy of its flyballs based on deviations
from the engine load torque G, and minimising a predic-
tion error between its observations ψ and the load arm angle
ψ0 specifying an engine speed ω0 via a relation known as
“nonuniformity of performance” (Pontryagin, 1962; Denny,
2002). Ultimately, this leads to a change in the engine’s
speed, here simplified as the angular velocity of the engine
shaft (geared into the engine flywheel), ∆ω. Expected hid-
den states µx are only implicitly defined and effectively re-
moved in the limit of deterministic dynamics using Assump-
tion 1.
Discussion
In this work, we introduced a rather unconventional treat-
ment of a Watt governor based on active inference. The
Watt (centrifugal) governor has played a central role in the
debate between dynamicist and cognitivist ways of thinking
about cognitive systems. Proposed as a dynamicist alterna-
tive analogy to the cognitivist digital computer (Van Gelder,
1995) and the sense-model-plan-act strategy implemented
by several cognitivist frameworks (Brooks, 1991; Hurley,
2001), since its introduction, a number of different works
have argued for the merits and limitations of this analogy
in addressing relevant questions in (philosophy of) cogni-
tive science, including for instance Eliasmith (1997); Bech-
tel (1998); Beer (2000); Chemero (2009); Seth (2014). The
discussion often focuses on the importance of represen-
tations to study and explain cognitive agents, echoing a
long standing debate over the role of these constructs for
theories of cognition (Fodor, 1983; Harvey, 1992; Varela
et al., 1991; Beer, 2000; Gallagher, 2006; Chemero, 2009;
Di Paolo et al., 2017). Echoing Harvey (1992) and following
in particular Chemero (2009), we distinguish between meta-
physical and epistemological claims when it comes to rep-
resentationalism. The first pertain to the nature of cognitive
systems, the second to our (the scientists’) best explanation
of cognitive systems. In the case of the Watt governor, one is
hard pressed to defend the metaphysical claim. Rather, the
debate usually focuses on the epistemological status of the
system: is it useful to explain a Watt governor in represen-
tational terms or, in other words, does taking the governor
flyball arm angle to represent the speed of the engine help
us understand the workings of the governor?
Active inference is a recent framework developed in the-
oretical neuroscience that describes several aspects of liv-
ing and cognitive systems in terms of the minimisation of
variational (or expected) free energy, which under simpli-
fying (Gaussian) assumptions reduces to a weighted sum
of prediction errors. According to active inference, action-
perception loops can be seen as a gradient descent on a free
energy functional describing normative behaviour for a sys-
tem. Perception is characterised as a process of Bayesian
inference on hidden world variables and action is portrayed
as the update of environmental properties to better reflect
current perceptual inferences, mediated by the goals of an
organism, e.g., its survival, in the form of prior Bayesian
beliefs. It has been argued that this framework, often ad-
dressed in terms of predictive processing, constitutes a new
paradigm for the study of cognitive agents (Clark, 2013; Ho-
hwy, 2013; Seth, 2014; Clark, 2015; Wiese and Metzinger,
2017; Hohwy, 2020). At the moment however, its role in
cognitive science remains highly controversial (Kirchhoff
and Froese, 2017; Colombo et al., 2018). In particular, some
authors suggest that internal representations are central to
predictive processing and are used to define computational
processes in a more classical sense (Hohwy, 2013, 2020),
some others claim that representations are detrimental for a
proper understanding of predictive processing (Bruineberg
et al., 2018), while others attempt to reconcile these dif-
ferent interpretations (Seth, 2014; Clark, 2015). Much of
this literature, however, seems to remain (almost deliber-
ately) unclear as to the metaphysical status of the central
constructs involved, with a few relevant works explicitly
favouring an instrumentalist interpretation (Anderson, 2017;
Colombo and Wright, 2017; Colombo et al., 2018; van Es,
2020).
Here we take a rather sobering perspective on the role of
active inference theories for cognitive and living systems,
especially arguing against claims regarding internal repre-
sentations in predictive processing and the metaphysical sta-
tus often implicitly granted to processes of variational free
energy/prediction error minimisation (Friston, 2013; Clark,
2013; Hohwy, 2013; Gładziejewski, 2018; Friston, 2019).
Our perspective aligns with epistemological stances (Robert,
2007; Beer and Williams, 2015) supporting an instrumental
role for frameworks such as Bayesian decision theory, in-
formation theory, dynamical systems, and in this case active
inference and predictive processing (Colombo and Wright,
2017), as possible interpretations of physical and cognitive
systems. In this light, a generative model may simply pro-
vide a possible way to describe a system’s behaviour, rather
than an ontological characterisation of its very nature and
inner workings (Baltieri and Buckley, 2019b). Generative
models can act as representations for an observer, as a valu-
able tool for the study of physical, living and cognitive sys-
tems, to describe them from an experimenter’s perspective
(Bechtel, 1998; Harvey, 2008; Chemero, 2009; Beer and
Williams, 2015; McGregor, 2017b), e.g., to understand the
relationship between the spindle arm angle in a Watt gover-
nor, and the speed of a steam engine. Their interpretation
as intrinsic properties of a system, i.e., generative models as
“internal models” used by the system itself (Fodor, 1983), is
on the other hand misleading.
Should one try to find a generative model of the kind ex-
pressed in equation (6) – inside – a Watt governor? No, as
this is simply a category mistake: observer-dependent un-
certainties (e.g., w, z) and arbitrary assumptions (e.g., pa-
rameter α  0) are relational terms that cannot be found
within this physical system (Harvey, 2008). A generative
model provides details for a scientist to specify a cost func-
tional, variational free energy, that can be used to describe
the (recognition) dynamics of a system (Buckley et al., 2017;
Ramstead et al., 2019) as seen in equation (11). The pres-
ence of a “generative model for a Watt governor” in equa-
tion (6), and the ensuing claims of an agent “minimising
variational free energy” while regulating the opening of a
steam valve, should thus be handled with care5.
This suggests that we should exercise caution in making
metaphysical claims using predictive processing, the free en-
ergy principle and active inference. Statements regarding
their mechanistic (Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013, 2020) or rep-
resentational (Rescorla, 2016; Hohwy, 2016) contents for
cognitive systems are in fact often ambiguous and mostly
based only on “evidence consistent with” generative models
in the brain (Colombo and Wright, 2017; Colombo et al.,
2018), as even the most recent reviews show (Walsh et al.,
2020).
At this point one might wonder what the relevance of ac-
tive inference and predictive processing might be in the cog-
nitive sciences. Here we suggest that probabilistic genera-
tive models ought to be recognised for their effectiveness as
a mathematical formalism connecting and extending ideas
such as the good regulator theorem in cybernetics (Conant
and Ashby, 1970) (see Seth (2014)), the internal model prin-
ciple in control theory (Francis and Wonham, 1976) (see
Baltieri (2019)), perceptual control theory (Powers, 1973)
in psychology, or the notion of entailment in theoretical bi-
ology (Rosen, 1991) (see Friston (2012); Ramstead et al.
(2019)). In this light, active inference can play an impor-
tant instrumental role for the overarching attempt of unify-
ing previous results in the study of adaptive agents in cy-
bernetics, control theory, psychology, neuroscience, dynam-
ical systems, information theory and physics. Under a more
general framework, notions such as feedback, stability, in-
ference, attractors, uncertainty and dynamics can be seen
from different, but complementary, perspectives that allow
for more complete descriptions of agents and agency, sim-
ilarly to the approach adopted, for instance, by Beer and
Williams (2015).
For example, while the notion of “inference” in cogni-
tive science often hinges on the intuition of (passive) infer-
ence to the best explanation (Chemero, 2009) and its limited
explanatory power for behaviour and agency (Seth, 2015;
Baltieri, 2019), a more general treatment of Bayesian in-
ference schemes and their connections to different fields
5In the same way one should be careful when explaining, for
example, Coulomb’s law: saying that an electron calculates its
distance from another electron, computes the force applied to that
electron and actuates said force in the real world would make for a
rather unusual and possibly confusing explanation (Latash, 2010).
can extend this narrow notion to include more useful in-
terpretations of inference. These include connections to
stochastic processes in non-equilibrium thermodynamics
(Seifert, 2012), where biological agents can be better charac-
terised as systems away from (thermodynamic) equilibrium
(Schro¨dinger, 1944). In this case, inference becomes sim-
ply a way to (mathematically) describe the statistical proper-
ties of agents represented in terms of non-equilibrium steady
states of a random process (Friston, 2019). A control theo-
retic reading of inference (Kappen et al., 2012) then intro-
duces the idea of inference to the most useful (normative)
behaviour (Baltieri, 2019; Seth, 2015), rather than to the
best explanation. Here, actions and policies of an agent are
described as an inferential process biased towards ensuring
that its normative constraints are met (i.e., a Bayesian in-
ference process conditioned on a system’s norms, such as
its survival and very existence (Barto et al., 2013; Baltieri,
2019)). Furthermore, one can then also recognise inference
as a relevant description of theories in evolutionary biology,
where following adaptive paths on the fitness landscape is
for example likened to a problem of Bayesian model selec-
tion (Cze´gel et al., 2019).
Conclusion
Using the Watt governor as a toy model, in this work we dis-
cussed the importance of generative models in the context
of predictive processing and active inference, extending our
previous critiques on their role as internal representations
(Bruineberg et al., 2018; Baltieri and Buckley, 2017, 2019b).
By defining a linear probabilistic generative model describ-
ing “observations” and “hidden states” from the perspective
of a Watt governor, we built a cost functional (i.e., varia-
tional free energy) to describe the behaviour of this system
as if (McGregor, 2017a) it was an agent trying to minimise
its prediction error to control its observations and regulate
the speed of a steam engine. Via the minimisation of this
cost functional under a couple of relatively straightforward
and common assumptions, i.e., overdamped dynamics and
an appropriate use of constants that ensure regulation via a
negative feedback loop, we then re-derived equations equiv-
alent to the mathematical treatment of an engine for the Watt
governor linearised near equilibrium. Using this as an ex-
ample, we then discussed epistemological and metaphysical
stances (Chemero, 2009) for generative models in predictive
processing and active inference, focusing on the former and
exerting caution on the latter. Our formulation shows that
generative models can easily be used to describe canonical
cases of the dynamical systems approach in cognitive sci-
ence.
This paper suggests that generative models are best un-
derstood as an epistemic tools for an observer to specify
the properties of a system they wish to study and their own
assumptions and sources of uncertainty during a process
of epistemological analysis (Colombo et al., 2018; van Es,
2020). As such, they are not internal representations for a
system, but rather constitute just a descriptive framework (a
representation, not internal (Harvey, 2008)) for an observer.
Seeing generative models as internal representations may
simply reflect a “mind projection fallacy” (Jaynes, 1990),
where epistemic constructs used by a scientist are assumed
to be real objects in the physical world.
Within the existing literature on the free energy principle,
active inference and predictive processing, we find an almost
deliberate conflation of realist and instrumentalist perspec-
tives, addressing how aspects of one’s model come to ex-
plain or constitute aspects of the mind. One example is the
discussion on boundaries of the mind (presumably aspects
of the world), which is premised on where Markov Blankets
(i.e., statistical properties of a model specifying conditional
independence between random variables) are located (Clark,
2017; Hohwy, 2017; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, 2019). This
case will however be addressed in more detail in the near
future.
The present work supports active inference as a poten-
tially useful descriptive language for cognition, highlighting
its instrumental role in studying action-perception within a
general mathematical framework including complementary
interpretations of an agent’s behaviour (Tishby and Polani,
2011; Beer and Williams, 2015), but remains cautious on the
metaphysical implications of generative models as internal
representations often found in the literature (Hohwy, 2013;
Clark, 2015; Rescorla, 2016).
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